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In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais,  Martimort and Rochet 
(Econometrica, 2000) could have been characterized by direct mechanisms even if the 
Revelation Principle does not apply in their setting.  The use of more sophisticated 
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Biais et al. [3] (BMR thereafter) consider a multi-principals game to analyze imperfect
competition under adverse selection in ﬁnancial markets. Strategic liquidity suppliers
post nonlinear prices (such as limit order schedules) which stand ready to trade with a
risk-adverse agent who has private information on the fundamental value of the asset
as well as on his hedging needs. BMR show that there exists an unique equilibrium in
convex schedules and they analyze its properties. In order to do that, they do not use
standard mechanism design methods.
Usually, in principal-agents games direct mechanisms are sufﬁcient to characterize
all equilibria. Peters [10] and Martimort & Stole [5] have shown that restricting the
attention to direct mechanisms may induce a loss of generality. Some equilibria can-
not be characterize by direct mechanisms. Nevertheless, if we consider more general
mechanisms, such as menus (or price schedules), one can characterize all equilibria of
every common agency game. The drawback of this approach is that menus (or price
schedules) are more difﬁcult to handle than direct mechanisms.BMR show that using
calculus of variations one can characterize equilibria even if we allow principals to use
menus. From that point of view BMR is an interesting contribution to the literature as
it provides a clear and rigorous methodology.1
Following Peters [11], we know that there are potentially two kind of equilibria in
a common agency game. We may have equilibria that can be characterized by direct
mechanisms and equilibria that can be characterized by menus only. Another method-
ology would have been to consider only direct mechanisms. If by doing that one cannot
characterize all equilibria, Peters [11] has shown that one characterizes regular equilib-
ria, i.e; equilibria which are robust to the introduction of more sophisticated communi-
cation schemes.
In this note, we show that the BMR equilibrium could have been characterized by
a much simpler approach: namely the restriction to direct mechanisms. This result is
not trivial. As we have said, it is has been shown, by the use of examples2 that direct
mechanisms are not sufﬁcient to characterize every equilibria of that class of games.
1It is also a interesting contribution to the ﬁnancial literature as it provides testable predictions.
2See Peters [10], Martimort & Stole [5] or Peck [9].
1On the other hand, it exist assumptions (roughly speaking separability conditions)
under which a common agency game has only equilibria that can be characterized by
direct mechanisms.3 These conditions are not satisﬁed by the BMR’s model. Thus, one
could have expected that the equilibrium derived by BMR could not be characterized by
direct mechanisms. It is not the case.
This suggests to indicate that we can use simpler or more traditional methodolo-
gies in common agency games. BMR’s model is a good example of such games. The
framework is simple but general enough to get interesting results and testable implica-
tion. However, our result is not general at all and we have to be very prudent in our
conclusions.
2 The Model
We use exactly the BMR’s model. We just brieﬂy present the formal aspects, for a more
complete description of the model and its properties please refer to the original article.
There are (n+1) players in the game, n principals and one agent. The principals
playﬁrst, theyoffersimultaneously“mechanisms”. A“mechanism”isamappingfroma
messagespace(Mi isthesetofallpossiblemessagespacesforprincipali, i∈{1,...,n})
to the decision space. Here a principal takes two decisions, a price T and a quantity q,
the decision space is
R2. Principal i offers a couple (Mi,(Ti(.),qi(.))). The agent can
either reject or accept the offer. If he accepts then he sends the message m ∈ Mi (we
must have Mi ∈ Mi), the agent gets from principal i the decision (Ti(m),qi(m)).
In the BMR model the interpretation of (Ti(m),qi(m)) is the following: the agent
must trade the quantity qi(m) at the price Ti(m). If the agent rejects the offer from
principal i, he gets (0,0) from him. The agent observes all the offered mechanisms and

















3see Attar et al. [1].
2The variables g and s are common knowledge. The variable q is known only by the





. The density function is denoted f. This density function is common
knowledge.
The principal i’s preferences over qi and Ti are represented by the following utility
function:
Ti−v(q)qi. (2)
We consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for that game. The problem is quite complex,
the set Mi can be very large (it formalizes all possiblecommunication schemes between
a principal and the agent), and it is difﬁcult to characterize the optimal choice of Mi.
In a simple principal-agent game (n = 1), the so-called “Revelation Principle” (My-
erson [7, 8]) states that one can ignore the choice of Mi, and consider that the message
space is given and equal to Q. One can show that the unique principal would have cho-
sen (Q,(T∗(.),q∗(.))) even if he would not have been constrained to play M = Q. The
couple (T∗(.),q∗(.)) is called a “direct mechanism”
An immediate consequence of the revelation principle is that we can restrict our
attention to direct “revealing” mechanisms. The direct mechanism (T∗(.),q∗(.)) is
“revealing” if it is such that the agent reveals the actual value of q. Considering only
“direct revealing mechanisms” simpliﬁes a lot the game and the optimal values of T∗(.)
and q∗(.) can be then characterized in most of the relevant games.
In contrast in multi-principals game (n > 1), the revelation principle does not apply:
one cannot impose Mi = Q and characterize all equilibria of the game. If we do this
we characterize only a subset of the equilibria of the game.4 If we want to characterize
all the equilibria of the game, we can only consider as possible message space all the
subset of the decision space, and consider that implement the message receive from
the agent (Peters [10] and Martimort & Stole [5] call this methodology “the Delegation
Principle”. In our particular game, rather than considering any element of the abstract
set M, we can consider only the subsets of























R2. Roughly speaking, the agent gets what he asks from any principal, but
he is allow to choose only in a restricted set. These mechanisms are called “menus”, or
sometimes “catalogs”.
Even if thisresult restricts the possiblestrategies, it does not simplifya lot the analy-
sis given that we still have problem with the characterization (considering all subsets of
R2 isoutofreach). BMRrestrictthecommunicationsetbyconsideringonlyaparticular
class of subset of
R2: they consider that principals are only allow to choose continuous
and (almost everywhere) differentiable menus. The message space is Q ⊂
R, a partic-
ular message is q ∈ Q, and if the agent sends the message ˜ q, he gets (T (˜ q), ˜ q), where
T (.) is a continuous function, with a ﬁnite number of non-differentiable points.
In the following section we will show that the BMR equilibrium could be attained
also using simple direct revealing mechanisms.5
3 Direct mechanisms equilibria
Principals are using direct mechanisms i.e; mappings (qi(.),Ti(.)) from Q to
R2. If the
agent q reports the vector ˜ q =
 ˜ q1,..., ˜ qn
 












































j =i as as given.
5Peters [11] claims that if we modify the interpretation of the BMR’s model, the revelation applies. If
qi is chosen by agent and observable by Principal i, there is no restriction to consider direct mechanisms.
But, if we consider this interpretation a direct mechanism for principal i becomes a function of qi, which
can be denotedT(.). So, in that case, the revelationprincipalis not helpful,characterizingsuch a function
is equivalent to characterize the optimal menu. In the following, we keep the natural interpretation of the
BMR’s model.
4In order to clarify the exposition, let us introduce few more notations.
We denote by ˜ q−i, with ˜ q−i =
 ˜ q1,..., ˜ qi−1, ˜ qi+1,..., ˜ qn
 
, the set of reports sent by
the agent to the other principals. We deﬁne the best reports ˜ q−i, given the type (which












































The reports ˜ q∗
−i are chosen optimally and they are functions of q and ˜ qi. If the solution






which can also by written






















Now, we derive the optimal strategy of the principal i. As we apply the Revelation
Principle, we assume the principal i offers incentive compatible mechanisms. In other
words principal i offers maps Ti(.),q(.) such that the agent reports to him his true type
q, given the mechanisms offered by the other principals.
The agent reports truthfully his type to principal i if
dU










Applyingtheenvelopetheorem(i.e. usingthefact that ¶˜ q∗












˙ qi(q)− ˙ Ti(q) = 0. (9)
We now can deﬁne the rent obtained by the agent. The rent is the utility that the agent
gets if his type is q given the offers made by all principals



























Applying again the envelope theorem, we get the derivative of U with respect to q:







The agent’s reports are characterized by ﬁrst order conditions. This can be problem-











is semi-deﬁnite negative. To get that, a necessary condition is
¶2U( ˜ q|q)
(¶qi)2 < 0 even if it is not sufﬁcient to ensure that the former matrix is semi-deﬁnite
negative. If messages are optimal when ˜ qi = q and when for any j  = i, ˜ qj = ˜ q∗
j, then the
conditions ∀q ∈ Q,
¶2U( ˜ q|q)
(¶qi)2 < 0 becomes










¨ qi(q)−gs2 ˙ q2
i (q)− ¨ Ti(q) < 0. (12)
Using standard methods of mechanism design,6 this last condition can also be written
as
∀q ∈ Q, q ˙ qi(q) ≥ 0. (13)
In words, he optimal quantity must be non decreasing with q. This condition is standard
in mechanism design theory. In a single principal setting, this latter condition and a
restriction on the utility function, namely the Spence-Mirrlees condition, would ensure
that our ﬁrst order conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient.
But these well known conditions are not sufﬁcient when the number of principals is
greater than one. To solve the main problem we will assume in the following that the
6See for example Laffont & Tirole [4].
6second order conditions are always satisﬁed and we will check ex-post that it is the case
at equilibrium.
If thefunctionqi(.)isincreasing, itobviouslymeans thatit can beﬁrst negative,then
equal to zero and ﬁnally positive. We denote [q,qa] the domain on which the function





which it is positive. Using these new notation, we can integrate the function ˙ U to get a
new expression ofU.

























if q < qa, and
U (q) = 0. (16)
if q ∈ [qa,qb], where q 6 qa 6 qb 6 q.
Note that the function q(q) must be continuous around qa and qb. Otherwise, by
applying a simple argument, it would be possible for the principal to improve his proﬁt:
when q ∈ [qa,qb], q(q) = 0, and the marginal proﬁt for the principal i is equal to zero.
If q(q) does not go to zero when q goes to qa (with q > qa), then a small increase of qa,
would increase principal i’s proﬁt.
Moreover, if qi(q) = 0, for some q, then we must have T (q) = 0.
Integrating by parts these expressions gives
R q























































































































































First, let us consider qa and qb, as given. The problem of the principal is equivalent to
a point-wise maximization problem. The principal maximizes the following expression







































7As we maximize with respect to q(q), the concavity of the principal’s ojective function is given by
BMR’s arguments.










































¶qi(q) −v(q) = 0.
(22)








































the function qj(.) (for all j different from i) are strictly increasing. Thus, without loss











.8 To see that, if qj(.) is strictly increasing, we can deﬁne a
inverse function q−1


























































Differentiating this equation with respect to qi(q) gives (as qi(q) is a parameter in (7),
this transformation makes sense):



























































As we consider a symmetric equilibrium all the principals j, (with j different from i),





















At equilibrium all principals offer the same mechanism (∀ j ∈ n qj(q) = q(q)), thus
equation (25) at equilibrium can be written
q−ngs2q(q) = t′(q(q)). (29)
Differentiating this equation with respect to q gives
1−ngs2˙ q(q) =t′′(q(q)) ˙ q(q). (30)
1
˙ q(q)
−ngs2 = t′′(q(q)). (31)









   
 
 





˙ q(q) −gs2 , (32)







1− ˙ q(q)gs2. (33)
































As usual we assume that the equilibrium is symmetric, then at equilibrium there is a


















   
 
 










1− ˙ q(q)gs2. (35)








  ˙ q(q)gs2
1− ˙ q(q)gs2. (36)

























  ˙ q(q)
1−gs2 ˙ q(q)gs2−v(q) = 0.
(37)
11Consequently, using the notation q∗(q) =
q−v(q)
















the expression derived by BMR.9












































We can derive the same expression for ˙ q(q), except that qm(q) = q∗(q)−
F(q)
gs2f(q).
Given the expressions of ˙ q(q), qa and qb must be such that the function q is contin-
uous. As the aggregate supply nq(.) is an increasing function, the form chosen for the
utility is justiﬁed. Usual conditions on the density f guaranty that q is strictly increas-
ing.10
Participation In order to be optimal, the proposed mechanisms must be not only incen-
tive compatible, but they must also be individuallyrational: the agent must accept them.
First, when his type belongs to the interval [qa,qb], as principals are offering to him the
degenerate mechanism (0,0), the agent does participate. When q belongs to [q,qa] the





9BMR consider aggregate values, we consider individual values. Except this slight difference in the
presentation, the formulas are strictly equivalent. The existence of a solution is shown in BMR. As the
proof is purely technical and applies straightforwardly in our context, we skip it.
10See Miravete [6] for a discussion of these conditions and their interpretation in the BMR’s model.
12equations (14) and (15), it is clear that the agent prefers to participate. It is also clear
that he prefers to accept all contracts than accepting only some of then. At equilibrium
equations (14) and (15) become









if q ≤ qa. The two expressions are increasing with n.
Concavity of the agent’s program In order to derive the equilibrium mechanisms,
we have followed what we could call a “ﬁrst order” approach. The agent’s best reply
is characterized by ﬁrst order conditions only. To conplete, we have to justify this
approach.
This can be done by using the conditions given by Stole [12]. But these conditions
are only valid when there are two principals. If we assume that n = 2, our model satisfy
these conditions. Stole’s theorems 5 and 6 apply in our setting. If there are only two






Thus, the following cross-derivatives are constant: ¶3U/¶q1¶q2¶q = 0, ¶2U/¶q1¶q2 = −gs2,
¶2U/¶q1¶q2 = −gs2, ¶2U/¶q1¶q = 0 and ¶2U/¶q2¶q = 0. The functions q1(.) and q2(.) are
increasing with respect to q. Finally, the equation (9) can also be written (for i = 1,2)
¶U
¶qi
˙ qi(q) = ˙ Ti(q). (44)
This last condition is equivalent to condition (12) in Stole [12]. Therefore, we can
conclude that the mechanisms (qi(.),Ti(.))i=1,2 are, in the language of Stole [12], com-
monly implementable, i.e; if he faces these two mechanisms, the agent (weakly) prefers
to report his true type to each principal rather than misreporting his information.













It is not difﬁcult to see that q∗(q) > qm(q). From proposition 8 in BMR q∗(q) >







, t′′(q) ≥ 0. (46)
We can get the same result for q ∈ [q(q),q(qa)]. As the function q(.) is continuous,







, t′′(q) ≥ 0. (47)
























At equilibrium, for every principal i, we have










˙ qi(q)− ˙ Ti(q) = 0, (50)












−t′(q(q)) = 0, (51)
whenever ˙ q(q)>0. If ˙ q(q)=0, orequivalentlyifq∈[qa,qb], thenq(q)=0,t(q(q))=0
andt′(q(q))=0 sincethefunctiont isconstantoverthatset. As thefunctiont isconvex,





  n, as the quantity q(q) is well
14deﬁned and exists for any q, then we can conclude that (q(q),...,q(q)) maximizes the














with respect to (q1,...,qi,...qn), where (q1,...,qi,...qn) ∈ Qn. If it is not the case, we
clearly get a contradiction. In words, if the agent faces the collection of mechanisms
((q(.),T(.)),...,(q(.),T(.))), reporting his typehonestlyto each principal is an optimal
strategy.
Alternatively, we can use the second order conditions given by BMR. Let us remark
that theequilibriummechanisms are equivalent. In the BMR’s model, at equilibriumthe
agent chooses the quantity q(q) from every principals and pay (or receive) the transfer
t(q(q))toeveryprincipal. In ourmodel,theagentsendsthemessageqtoeveryprincipal
and then get from each of them the quantity q(q) and the transfer T(q), where T(q) =
t(q(q)). From that it is clear that if reporting honestly his type, (i.e; if he sending the
message q to every principal), is not an equilibrium behavior, then asking the quantity
q(q) is not an equilibrium behavior in the BMR’s model.









. He could have got the same allocation in the BMR’s game, by
asking the quantity q
 ˜ q
 
. More generally by sending the array of messages
 ˜ q1,..., ˜ qn
 









Thus, the second order conditions can also be obtained from Proposition 9 in BMR.
This last comment suggests an intuition for our main result. Each principal is indif-
ferent between using direct mechanisms or menus, given that the other principals keep
using their optimal menus. This is a very general feature of common agency models, as
it is shown if Martimort & Stole [5] and it is used by Peters [11] to prove his two ﬁrst
theorems. But in the BMR model, the principal i is also indifferent between a situation
in which the principal j is using the optimal menu, and a situation in which the principal
j is using the optimal direct mechanism.
In the ﬁrst situation, the agent, if he has the type q, asks, say qi(q) to principal i and
qi(q) to principal j. In the second situation, he asks for qi(q) from principal i and sends
15the message q to principal j and he gets from him the quantity qj(q). Obviously, the
three players are indifferent between the two situations.
Therefore, we can see that the menus derived by BMR and the direct mechanisms
derived in the present note are equivalent. It is important to notice that this is not a
general feature of common agency game. There are examples in the literature (see
Peters [10] and Martimort & Stole [5]) showing that this equivalence between menus
and direct mechanisms is not general at all.
4 Conclusion
Our result suggests four main remarks:
Direct mechanisms are not able to characterize every equilibriain a common agency
game. However, they seem to be quite powerful. It would be very interesting to have a
general theorem giving conditions under which an equilibrium cannot be characterized
by direct mechanisms.
The BMR methodology remains interesting since we do not have a general theorem.
As we have said in the introduction, we do not have any hints on the generality of our
result. An interesting extension of this work, would be to do the same computations for
the other models in which menus are used to derive the equilibria.
The BMR equilibrium is the unique equilibrium with convex price schedules. This
does not means that is the unique equilibrium of the BMR game. The existence of other
equilibria remains an open question. If there exist other equilibria, we do not know if
direct mechanisms are able to characterize them.
Some equilibria of common agency games can be characterized by direct mecha-
nisms, some that cannot be. From a technical point of view, it would be interesting to
have result on their stability for example. It would be also interesting to know which
kind of equilibria is more likely to be reached empirically.
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